【案例】RJJ by Johnson v. Shineman(中英双语) - 通儒院教学论坛

上诉人约翰逊提起诉讼以纠正在一季度音乐学习中据称错误的不及格评定，及损害赔偿。在法官审理中，做出了有利于被告人的判决，约翰逊上诉。当然，相关事实没有争议。约翰逊在1980-1901学年是Stanberry中学的高中生，他参加了乐队与合唱音乐课程，前者由被告人 Larry Rathbun 教，后者由被告人Laurie Rathbun教，被告人Shineman是学校的负责人，被告人Greever是初高中校长。

在与音乐教学相关课程的活动中，两位Rathbun老师安排了一次由学校合唱团于1980年12月17日在斯坦柏利教堂的表演，还于1980年11月18日安排了一次由乐队和合唱团为学校表演的圣诞节目，在学期的第一天，Rathbun老师告诉同学们，没有人可以不参加表演，除非直系家属中有人死掉，或者在音乐会和表演前通过一定的方式向老师请假，参加演出是完成课程学习的要求。

1980年8月约翰逊和他的家人被邀请和亲戚们在夏威夷过圣诞节，8月就已经买了飞机票并预定1980年11月17日出发，约翰逊参与了他的课程，包括乐队和合唱团直到12月16日，但是第二天他就离开去夏威夷旅行了。他没有出现或参加12月17日的合唱团的教会节目，也没有参加12月18日的学校节目，因为无故缺席，约翰逊在第二学期的乐队与合唱课程中的成绩被评定为F。

引起争议的证据在于约翰逊是否提前提醒了任何一个Rathbun老师他去夏威夷的预期旅行，以及他不能参加合唱和乐队表演的事实。一审法院认为他没有，约翰逊没有记录证明支持这个裁决，从而使裁决转向了证人的可信度。因此一审判决约翰逊的缺席没有提前通知，也没有理由给任何一个Rathbun老师。

约翰逊在他的公平救济去改正音乐课中的得分和他随之而来的班级排名的申请中的首要基础是强迫乐队和合唱团的成员参加面向圣诞节的活动，圣诞节相当于宗教纪念节日，这违反了美国和密苏里宪法关于政教分离的规定。约翰逊在他的提出的与初审法庭做出的不利决策相关的第一点申诉如下：

“一审法院错在他的判决中错误地认为圣诞音乐会在本质上是世俗的，不足以促进或抑制宗教违反宪法规定，因为证据证明活动是没有宗教性质的，法院应该维持原告在这个问题上的立场，达成一个让请愿的一方满意的判决。”

能从所谓的错误观点的声明中提取出来的最多的是声明证据缺乏物质支持，或者证明证据和法院认为”圣诞音乐会是世俗的，无益于宗教的目的”的判决是相反的。然而在接下来的辩论中，上诉人并没有努力论证为什么法院的判决在决定事实问题上是错的。相反，上诉人假定音乐活动的宗教内容和目的，提出宪法的主张，原审法庭犯下的错误在于促进”给予一个不参加宗教功能活动的学生不及格的分数”。这个观点失败因为记录中包含了大量证据支持原审法庭的结论，即讨论中的活动是世俗的，没有宗教的影响、目标或者相互作用。

很显然，上诉者的原始投诉和被告人对在原审法庭之前提出的原始问题的回答，即学校的圣诞节目是世俗的还是宗教的，如果是后者，他们是否真的促进了教义信念，这个议题基本的事实就转向了活动的内容和表演的环境。

证据完全支持初审法庭的判决，即节目是世俗的。音乐会的全部包括音乐、学校乐队，没有声乐演奏。没有祈祷、没有历史剧，没有神职人员参与。选择也包括与季节相关的圣诞圣歌，但这些也穿插一些其他季节新的歌曲如铃儿响叮当。

被告人举了个案例，审查被学校地区采用的描绘内容的指南，描绘了庆祝宗教和世俗的重大节日可以包含宗教内容。法庭认为一个世俗的音乐教育的活动包含宗教音乐不足以表明违反宪法关于政教分离的指示。这个案例解决了在其他主题的节目二中圣诞圣歌的问题。

我们认为上诉人关于11月17号和18号的节日包含宗教特征是没有依据的，初审法庭关于活动是世俗性质的判决是正确的。尽管关于事实问题的决定足以解决上诉人在陈述中提出的第一点。陈述和争论内容之间的分歧表面上支持进一步的讨论是必要的这种观点，我们这样做仅仅是出于完全探究上诉人论点的兴趣，并不暗含着支持已经论证过的错误观点。

对上诉人的宪法争论的主旨是在于，不应该因为无故缺席音乐节目，而对年轻的约翰逊强加纪律，因为节目的宗教性质排除执行考勤。本案的事实下，约翰逊缺乏站在维护宪法的缺陷，因为一直没有对约翰逊的个人权利造成不利影响。

正如已经讨论的，约翰逊没有通知他的老师rathbuns，他即将缺席，尽管他的夏威夷之行已经在节目计划之前的三个月已经确定。因此他不能自称为缺席是基于宗教理由，即他被强迫参与十二月的节目。他的缺席显然是以满足自己的方便和乐趣，不是抵触在节目内容。这也仅仅是在后来，当惩罚级别发布后，即反对学校推进宗教功能浮出水面。

在论述宪法争议中，约翰逊选择忽视被允许缺席的便利性，如果是因为反对Rathbun指令下强制参加音乐表演系。这个案子无可争议的一点是，Rathbun证言，两名学生被允许缺席圣诞音乐会，因为这不是他们的宗教信仰。此外，Rathbun作证说，他会答应请求约翰逊，如果他曾要求缺席。宪法，索赔主张在当前提出的事实下，以下假定和推断是不成立的，Rathbun一个学生的请求不参与圣诞节目要求被拒绝，而后遭受惩罚。约翰逊不可以如此个人化地断言，因为缺席是被允许的，但他没有提出任何申请。

一方站在挑战法律的合宪性（或规则或指令可以视情况）仅仅是因为对自己的权利带来不利影响。作为一般规则，如果有一个法律诉讼程序没有宪法的缺陷，他没有站出来争辩说，如果应用到在假想第三方的情况下这将是违宪。阿尔斯特城县法院。诉艾伦，442美国，140，99最高。2213，60，777（1979）；l.ed.2d布罗德里克诉奥克拉荷马，413美国601，93最高。2908，37，830（1973）l.ed.2d。

在米勒警察诉圣路易斯退休制度的的案子中，296 s.w.2d 78（模式1956），米勒作为原告，因为她丈夫（圣路易斯警官）的死亡索取利益。初审法院在当地法院驳回了她的请求，米勒没有把他的索赔递交到原始管辖权法定归属的警察退休系统董事会。在上诉中，米勒认为法令违宪，因为诉讼程序中，在这之前没有传讯或者告知他，董事会没有授权监誓。法院认为米勒不应质疑宪法问题，因为他已经请求不听证董事会，她也始终没有被剥夺如下权利，获得证人的证据，传票获得她的证据。

毫无疑问，如果约翰逊能请求缺席从11月17日和18的汇演并被允许，他可能就不会挑战规则。目前的控告是同一种情况，因为它仅仅基于这种理论假设：即约翰逊请求缺席将被拒绝并因不参加表演而受到惩罚。在这里，事实上，约翰逊没有获得季度学期学分不是因为他应该遵循规则，而他反对宗教而没有参与节目，而是因为他没有在他的休假计划没有提前通知rathbuns，因为他没有试图为他的缺席寻求适当的理由来遵循规则。

在他的上诉的第二个点，约翰逊混合了多个论点，他们似乎主张如下：（一）法院证据表明，rathbuns已经提前宣布出席表演的义务，约翰逊知道规则没有任何证据支持（b）不及格的惩罚是“滥用自由裁量权，”（C）在受访者有权评估对约翰逊等级的惩罚，他有权在符合正当程序下被告知并且获得听证，并且一审法院错误地依靠事件而不是证据。

对上诉人的论点缺乏有效的证据，因为证据显示rathbuns在学期开始通知了所有学生，要求参加演出的。Rathbun还证实，通知包括警告，一个不及格会处以缺席，恕不另行通知。此外，证人证明约翰逊提前确认，他知道如果缺席圣诞节目他会得到一个不及格，但他还是去旅行了。法院证据是经由大量的实质的证据支持，而不是大与量的证据相冲突，约翰逊是完全了解他的无故缺勤的后果。

和“老师的自由裁量权”相关的第二点不予讨论，首先是因为这一点不符合规则84.04（d），因为这与法院任何特定的行为或裁定审判无关，并且未能指出为什么，什么情况下任何裁决声称是错误的。其次，争论的焦点不在争论部分，开发并没有引用权威的描述或将这描述概念化。

在第三名争论中，上诉人不厌其烦强调约翰逊的音乐课程的成绩，侵犯了宪法赋予的财产权，根据美国宪法第十四修正案，因此这些行为不得采取不正当的程序。这些行为还包括那些处理学生接受公共教育的权利。不必要呼吁这一趋势，即是否应在公共教育领域考虑，学生在特定的课程成绩或班级排名获得财产权。正当程序的说法是由上诉人首次在这个案子中。上诉人的请求不应有这样的论点，没有迹象表明主体出席了法院审判。宪法问题必须尽早提出否则将被放弃。富勒诉堪萨斯市北部的学校区，629，404（1981 s.w.2d mo.app。）。上诉人在这个阶段没有被授权考虑争论。

最后，上诉人认为，只有在这点的阐述上，“法院不应该依赖事情而不依赖证据。”这一抽象命题唯一的关联是，早前声称没有记录或者证据表明已经通知约翰逊，他的缺席将不及格。上诉人的论点指出无论是否被记录，排除“F”级通惩罚是否告知，在这个案例里，上诉人的信念没有可审查的东西。判断是肯定的。

Appellant Johnson, a high school student, brought suit to correct an allegedly erroneous failing grade assessed for one quarter in music studies, and for damages. In a bench trial, the court found for defendants and Johnson appeals. Affirmed.

Certain relevant facts were not in dispute. Johnson was a senior at Stanberry *912 High School during the academic year 1980 to 1981. He was enrolled in music courses of band and chorus, the former being taught by respondent Larry Rathbun and the latter by respondent Laurie Rathbun. Respondent Shineman is the superintendent of schools and respondent Greever is the principal of the junior-senior high school.

Among the activities related to the courses in music instruction, the Rathbuns had scheduled a performance by the school choir at a local Stanberry church the evening of December 17, 1980 and a Christmas program by the band and chorus for the school December 18, 1980. On the first day of the school term, students had been informed by the Rathbuns that no one would be excused from a performance unless by reason of a death in the immediate family or by means of a request made to the Rathbuns before the concert or performance. Attendance at performances was a requirement for completing the course of study.

In August, 1980, Johnson and his family were invited to spend Christmas with relatives in Hawaii and airline tickets were purchased and reservations were made in August for departure December 17, 1980. Johnson attended his classes, including band and chorus, through December 16 but he left on the Hawaii trip the following day. He did not appear or participate in the church program by the chorus December 17 nor the school program December 18. By reason of unexcused absence, Johnson was assessed an F grade for the second half-semester in band and chorus.

The evidence was disputed as to whether or not Johnson informed either of the Rathbuns in advance of his expected trip to Hawaii and the fact that he would not attend the performances of the chorus and band. The trial court concluded he did not. Johnson makes no claim the record lacks evidentiary support for this finding which turns on the credibility of the witnesses. We are therefore bound by the express finding by the trial court that Johnson's absence was without advance notice and without excuse given for the absence by either of the Rathbuns.

The primary basis urged by Johnson in his petition for equitable relief to correct the grade in music and his consequent class standing was the contention that compulsory attendance by chorus and band members at programs oriented to the Christmas season amounts to a religious ceremony violative of provisions in the United States and Missouri Constitutions concerning separation of church and state. The first point advanced by Johnson on this appeal related to the adverse decision by the trial court on this issue and reads as follows:

"The trial court erred in its finding that the Christmas concert was secular in nature and did not serve to advance or inhibit religion in violation of constitutional provisions, because the evidence established the unguided religious nature of the program, and the trial court should have sustained plaintiffs' position on this matter and entered a decree in their favor on Count One of the petition."

This purported statement of the point does not comply with Rule 84.04(d) because it does not indicate wherein and why the decision by the trial court is claimed to be erroneous. The most which can be extracted from the statement of the point of alleged error is a claim that the evidence lacks substance to support or is contrary to the finding by the court that the Christmas concert was secular and therefore advanced no religious objective. In the argument which follows, however, appellants make no effort to demonstrate why the court's finding purportedly errs in deciding the fact questions. Instead, appellants assume the religious content and objective of the music program and then advance a constitutional claim that the error of the trial court lay in approving "the giving of a failing grade because of non-appearance of a student at a religious function." The point fails because the record contains substantial evidence to support the conclusion by the trial court that the programs in question were secular and without religious impact, objective or interplay.

*913 Quite apparently, appellants' original complaint and the answer by defendants brought before the trial court the threshold question of whether Christmas programs by the school were secular or religious and, if the latter, whether they did or did not advance some doctrine of faith. The issue was one essentially of fact turning on evidence as to the content of the programs and the circumstances of performance. The evidence fully supports the finding by the trial court that the programs were secular. The concerts consisted entirely of music and, in the case of the school band, some numbers were without vocal renditions. There were no prayers, no pageantry and no clergy participated. The selections did include Christmas carols associated with the season, but these were interspersed with other seasonal numbers such as Jingle Bells.

Apparently, respondents base their assumption that the programs were religious solely on the fact that Christmas carols are oriented in content to Christian belief. Appellants cite no case, and independent research has disclosed none, which condemn a public school music program as a religious observance violative of the establishment clause of the Constitution merely because music having a religious theme is included in the selections performed. Respondents cite Florey v. Sioux Falls School Dist. 49-5, 619 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir.1980), cert. denied 449 U.S. 987, 101 S.Ct. 409, 66 L.Ed.2d 251 (1980), a case which reviewed guidelines adopted by the school district to delineate the extent which programs observing holidays of religious and secular significance could include material with religious content. The court there held that the mere fact a program of secular music education included religious music did not alone brand the activity as violative of the constitutional directive for separation of church and state. That case expressly dealt with programs of Christmas carols, among other subjects.

We conclude that appellants' assumption as to the religious character of the December 17 and 18 programs is without basis and that the trial court's finding as to the secular nature of the activities was correct. Although this determination of the fact question is sufficient to rule the first point as set out in appellants' statement of the point, the divergence between that statement and the content of the argument ostensibly supporting the point is such that further discussion is necessary. We do so only in the interests of fully exploring appellants' contentions and without indicating approval of the briefing deficiencies already noted.

（晶晶从这一段开始翻译）The thrust of appellants' constitutional argument is that no discipline could be imposed on the younger Johnson for unexcused absence from the music programs because the religious nature of the programs precluded enforced attendance. Under the facts of this case, Johnson lacks standing to assert the constitutional defect because there has been no adverse impact on Johnson's own rights.

As has already been discussed, Johnson gave no notice to the instructors, the Rathbuns, of his impending absence even though his trip to Hawaii had been planned more than three months in advance of the programs. He therefore can make no claim to have protested on religious grounds his enforced participation in the December programs. His absence was obviously to suit his own pleasure and convenience and not by offense taken at the program content. It was only much later, at the time the punitive grades were distributed, that the objection to school advancement of religious function surfaced.

正如已经讨论的，约翰逊没有通知他的教官rathbuns，他即将缺席，尽管他的夏威夷之行已经在节目计划之前的三个月已经确定。因此他不能自称为缺席是基于宗教理由，即他被强迫参与十二月的节目。他的缺席显然是以满足自己的方便和乐趣，不是抵触在节目内容。这也仅仅是在后来，当惩罚级别发布后，即反对学校推进宗教功能浮出水面。

Johnson has chosen to ignore, in his discussion of the constitutional argument, the availability for excused absences under the Rathbun directive for compulsory attendance at music department performances. Undisputed in this record is the testimony of Larry Rathbun that two students who were excused from participation in the Christmas concert were excused because of their religious beliefs. Moreover, Mr. Rathbun testified that he would have excused Johnson had Johnson asked to be excused. The claim of constitutional deprivation asserted *914 is, under the facts presented, no more than a supposed and hypothetical creation applicable to a situation in which a Rathbun student requested and was denied excuse from the Christmas program and then suffered a grade penalty for absence. Johnson can assert no such claim personally because he admittedly sought no excuse when excuses were available and in fact granted.

A party has standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute (or rule or directive as the case may be) only insofar as it has an adverse impact on his own rights. As a general rule, if there is no constitutional defect in the application of a statute to a litigant, he does not have standing to argue that it would be unconstitutional if applied to third parties in hypothetical situations. County Court of Ulster Cty. v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 60 L.Ed.2d 777 (1979); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973).

In the case of Miller v. Police Retirement System of St. Louis, 296 S.W.2d 78 (Mo. 1956), Miller was a claimant for benefits by reason of the death of her husband, a St. Louis police officer. The trial court dismissed her petition on the ground that Miller had failed to present the claim to the Board of Trustees of the Police Retirement System where original jurisdiction for claims was vested by statute. On appeal, Miller contended the statute was unconstitutional because proceedings before the Board gave her no right of subpoena and the Board was not empowered to administer oaths. The court held Miller to have no standing to raise the constitutional question because, having requested no hearing before the Board, she had not been denied the right to have testimony presented only by sworn witnesses and she had not been denied the right to the use of a subpoena to obtain her evidence.

"The rule is well settled that a person may not urge the unconstitutionality of a statute in the absence of showing injury. A person may question the constitutionality of a statute only when it is applied to his disadvantage." Miller, supra at page 79-80.

Beyond any doubt, had Johnson applied for excuse from the December 17 and 18 programs and been excused, he would have had no claim and no standing to challenge the rule. The present claim is in the same posture because it is based merely on the theoretical possibility that Johnson could have been denied an excuse and penalized for failure to attend the performances. The fact here is that Johnson suffered a failing quarter semester mark not because of violation of a rule requiring participation in a performance to which he objected on grounds of religion but because he did not inform the Rathbuns in advance of his vacation plan and because he made no attempt to validate his absence by seeking an available exception to application of the rule.

On the authorities cited, Johnson has no standing to challenge the rule for attendance at the Christmas programs because the content of the programs was irrelevant and not associated with the impact of the rule on him and the injury of which he complains.

In his second point on appeal, Johnson intermingles various contentions which appear to assert the following: (a) The finding by the trial court that the Rathbuns announced in advance the rule for compulsory attendance at performances and that Johnson was aware of the rule lacks any evidentiary support, (b) The penalty of a failing mark for non-attendance at a performance is an abuse of "tutorial discretion," (c) Before respondents were entitled to assess a grade penalty against Johnson, he was entitled to notice and a hearing comporting with due process, and (d) The trial court erroneously relied on matters not in evidence.

The first branch of appellants' contention lacks validity because the record *915 shows from the testimony of the Rathbuns that notice was given all students at the beginning of the semester as to the requirement for attendance at performances. Laurie Rathbun also testified that the notice included the warning that a failing grade would be imposed for absence, without prior notification. Additionally, a witness testified to an advance acknowledgement to her by Johnson that he knew he would receive a failing grade for missing the Christmas program, but he was taking the trip anyway. The finding by the trial court that Johnson was fully aware of the consequences of his unexcused absence is supported by substantial evidence and is not against the greater weight of the evidence.

The second subpoint related to "tutorial discretion" will not be discussed, first because the point does not comply with Rule 84.04(d) in that it is unrelated to any particular action or ruling by the trial court and fails to indicate wherein and why any ruling is claimed to be erroneous. Secondly, the contention is not developed in the argument portion and there is no citation of authority describing or applying a concept of this description.

In the third contention, appellants argue at length that Johnson's music course grade and his class standing constitute property rights endowed with constitutional protection and, under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, such rights may not be taken away without due process. Cases cited include those dealing with entitlement of students to a public education. It is unnecessary for disposition of this appeal to consider whether the student at a public educational facility acquires a property right in a particular course grade or class rank. The due process argument is raised by appellants for the first time on this appeal. No such contention was made in appellants' petition and there is no indication that the subject was presented to the trial court. Constitutional issues must be raised at the earliest opportunity or they are waived. Fuller v. North Kansas City School Dist., 629 S.W.2d 404 (Mo.App.1981). Appellants have no entitlement to consideration of the argument at this late stage of the case.

Finally, appellants suggest, only in the statement of the point, "that the trial court should not have relied on matters not in evidence." The only relevance of this abstract proposition is to the earlier claim that the record included no evidence of notice to Johnson that his absence would result in a failing grade. The subject is not otherwise developed and appellants' argument points to no matter, apart from the subject of notice of the "F" grade, allegedly considered by the trial court outside the record. As to this aspect of the case, appellants' brief presents nothing for review.